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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES o q RESTITUTION. By Edward S. Thurston. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
1940. pp. xxviii, 964. $6.00.
This collection of cases and materials is designed to be used in the place of Mr.
Thurston's earlier case book on Quasi-Contracts. The title "Restitution" indicates
the broader scope of this book. 'The former book confined itself almost entirely to
actions at law to the exclusion of suits in equity. This work on Restitution recognizes
that the same fundamental principles applicable to actions of this kind at law are
equally applicable to suits in equity. The equitable suit usually involves a prayer
for an additional and peculiarly equitable relief, but 'insofar as the actual recovery
of money or property asked in the equitable suit is concerned the principles control-
ling in equity and at law are similar. Hence the author has borrowed several cases
upon reformation and rescission from the second volume of Professor Ames' classical
collection.
The author may have been influenced to some extent in his choice of the title by
the Restatement title "Restitution", in which is included most of the matter com-
monly classified as quasi-contractual in previous works by Keener, Woodward,
Williston, Laube and the author. The term "quasi-contract" was probably borrowed
from the Roman Law--"obligationes quasi ex contractu." The thought underlying
the writ of debt and the later indebitatus assumpsit was that the defendant had
something belonging to the plaintiff. Since there was'no tort involved the implication
of a promise seemed the better theory and in implying that promise Mansfield in
Moses v. McFarlan1 borrowed from the 'Roman Law and placed the tag "quasi-
contract" upon these unjust enrichment cases. The original issuance of writs of debt,
intdebitatus assumpsit and account in these quasi-contract cases caused the term
"quasi-contract" to gain a strictly legal savor excluding cases in equity. This was
unfortunate, because the same fundamental thought underlying the recovery of ben-
efits conferred under fraud or mistake in reformation and rescission suits is present
in actions at law commonly designated quasi-contractual. The basic question in both
is: Has the defendant something which, in justice, belongs to the plaintiff? It is
true that different considerations enter into the equitable suits from those which are
material at law, but they are all germane to this fundamental question. The fact that
procedural differences originally separated them should not be permitted to perpetuate
that separation, particularly when these procedural differences between law and equity
are rapidly disappearing in practice. It is to be noted that actions upon judgments,
actions under statutory provisions, and actions upon an account stated are not in-
cluded in this work. This is a proper exclusion, since they are not properly
"Restitution".
The author has retained the division he created in the earlier work to a large extent.
Not much improvement is possible upon his excellent creation of order out of what
must have been a chaotic mass under the over-generalized recovery of that which
"in equity and good conscience" belonged to the plaintiff. The division into recovery
for benefits conferred in the performance of a contract, under mistake, under com-
pulsion and benefits voluntarily conferred is retained. The order has been changed
slightly. Cases dealing with waiving a tort and suing quasi-contractually for benefits
acquired by the defendant were placed in the last chapter of the old book. They
1. 2 Burr. 1005 (K. B. 1760).
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appear in the chapter following the introductory matter in the new book. The
author's purpose was apparently to present matter at the outset, in addition to that
contained in the introduction, which would aid the student in grasping the nature
of the quasi-contractual remedy.
The chapter on benefits conferred in the performance of a contract maintains the
same fundamental division as appeared in the earlier work. However, the section
dealing with benefits conferred prior to further performance becoming impossible is
not divided as previously between cases where further performance was impossible
on the part, first of the defendant, and secondly on the part of the plaintiff. Holliday
v. Coe2 and similar cases are not divided from Reina v. Cross3 and similar cases.
The new approach in the chapter upon recovery for mistake distinguishing between
bargaining and non-bargaining transactions seems to have been made necessary by
the inclusion of the new material.
When the book was opened to equitable matter, sufficient comprehension would
seem to require Eaton v. Eaton4 and similar donee cases. In this chapter on mistake
there is not as detailed a division of the matter as appeared in the earlier book.
Here as in the preceding section upon recovery where complete performance is
impossible, there is an abandonment of some of the subdivisions appearing in the
other book. The discontinuance of the divisions "Mistake as to the Nature of
Subject-Matter of a Contract" and "Mistake as to Existence of Subject-Matter of
a Contract" and the grouping of this matter under one heading--"Mistake as to the
Subject-Matter of a Contract" may be desirable as placing the student on his own to
a greater extent in his discovery and expression of distinguishing features between
cases within one section. Yet the writer as a student appreciated the friendly help
extended by the more detailed treatment and enjoyed seeing the indicated differences
and on occasion had the temerity to believe that he would express the distinguishing
feature a little differently. However, the less detailed treatment can be broken down
in the class room.
The new book adds a great many later decisions to the former one. The new ones
are well edited. The note material here as in the earlier work is most helpful. The
author is not a devotee of offering note material in the form of a long list of cita-
tions suffixed or prefixed with the words "accord" or "contra". His clear statements
indicating distinguishing features are both helpful and provocative to students.
EUGENE J. KEEFE
JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. By Harry C. Shriver. Buffalo:
Dennis & Co. 1940. pp. xvi, 360. $3.50.
If his name had not been Oliver Wendell Holmes he would have a place in legal
history. Before he had any judicial experience in 1881 "The Common Law" was pub-
lished. It continues to be a legal classic. In 1883, at the age of 41, he became a
Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Lacking less than one month
he served twenty years, during more than three of which he was Chief Justice. With
2. 3 Ind. 26 (1851).
3. 6 Cal. 29 (1856).
4. 15 Wis. 259 (1862).
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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this judicial experience he became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1902, and served until his resignation in 1932, at the age of 91.
It is Justice Holmes' experience as a judge of the highest court of his native
Massachusetts that "Judicial Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes" attempts to cover.
Excerpts of Holmes' opinions from Volume 134 of the Massachusetts Reports to
Volume 182 are found in this book. The later opinions written by him as an Asso-
ciate Justice of the United States Supreme Court should not blind one to his service
on the Massachusetts Court. In fact, a reading of Mr. Shriver's collection of cases
should prepare one to expect the judicial attitude with which Americans became so
familiar between 1902 and 1932.
That the power of the legislative branch of the Government should be upheld unless
enactments clearly violated constitutional limitations was a part of Holmes' philosophy.
Looking back at the prevailing precedents of fifty years ago the reader must realize
that his views frequently required him to make close distinctions between cases, and
often he urged the new application of old principles. In fact, the author's note points
out that while a state judge Holmes wrote only one opinion holding a state statute
to be beyond the power of the legislature to enact.1
Freedom to act and freedom to urge others to act are matters still debated in the
strife between employer and employee. The police power of the State might be in-
voked by the legislature to prevent public speeches without a permit in Boston. How-
ever, Holmes would allow the employees to patrol before an employer's premises and
would deny injunctive relief to prevent the boycott and strike. His notion was that
combination of laborers to secure better wages and improved conditions is no different
than the right of the merchant to reduce prices which may drive his competitor from
business.
Cases involving the Massachusetts Bill of Rights found Judge Holmes looking to
the spirit of these fundamental guarantees. When in obedience to legislative provision
an indictment failed to conclude that the acts of the accused were against the peace
of the Commonwealth, Judge Holmes wrote "the Legislature may dispense with a
purely formal averment which would give the defendant no additional information,
and the omission of which would not prejudice him."2
Many opinions in this collection trace the history of their times. The validity of
a divorce secured in a state other than the domicil has perplexed courts for many
years; but forty years ago, near the beginning of the divorce era, Holmes left a
precedent frequently cited.3 Questions whether a gift of trading stamps to a purchaser
is gambling; 4 whether the State may prohibit spite fences erected for malevolent
purposes;G whether it is within the police power of a state to authorize the killing
of diseased animals, and if it should turn out that the animals are not diseased whether
due process requires compensation be given to the owner; 6 whether within a small
area surrounding the State House in Boston the legislature might prohibit any sky-
scrapers more than seventy feet in height; 7 or whether Boston might legally prevent
1. Lorden v. Coffey, 178 Mass. 489 (1901).
2. Commonwealth v. Freelove, 150 Mass. 66 (1889).
3. Andrews v. Andrews, 176 Mass. 92 (1900).
4. Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 578 (1901).
5. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 (1889).
6. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891).
7. Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199 (1901).
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sales of flowers in a public streets-now well settled by numerous precedents, were
of first impression when Holmes began his judicial career.
All that Mr Shriver pretends to do is to reprint portions of a few of Judge Holmes'
1300 opinions written during his twenty years on the State Court. These samples
portray Holmes' fundamental philosophy, his epigrammatic flair, his attachment to
principles, and his belief that the Courts should not restrain the will of the people
as expressed through legislative enactments unless it is clearly contrary to the Con-
stitution's prohibitions. His views are recorded principally in the majority opinions,
which indicates that Judge Holmes on the State Court was a dominating figure or
else that he was as conservative as his associates. He served longer than any other
Judge on the Supreme Judicial Court during his time, but he was the fourth greatest
dissenter between 1883 and 1902, and never wrote in excess of two dissenting opinions
in that Court during any one year. An appendix cites all Massachusetts Reports in
which Holmes wrote any opinion.
The reader of this volume will probably conclude that Mr. Justice Holmes' reputa-
tion while a member of the United States Supreme Court will not suffer from a
familiarity with his opinions recorded in the Massachusetts Reports.
E. C. ARNOLD±
ORGANIZATION or CoURTs. By Roscoe Pound. Boston: Little Brown & Co. 1940.
pp. ix, 322. $5.00.
This excellent work by Dean Emeritus Pound, which forms the second work
published in the Judicial Administration Series, might well have been entitled, "The
Disorganization of Courts in America", for it is only the author's plea for organiza-
tion that justifies the title. For seven out of the book's eight Chapters the author
gives ii exhaustive detail the various points of variance and defects in the American
judicial system commencing with the English model and continuing down throughout
the early and late colonial periods, the formative stages of federal and state courts
after the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, up to and including the present time. The
eighth and last chapter presents the principles and outline of a modem organization
of courts based on an integrated and simplified judiciary having control over each
element of the judicial process.
Dean Pound is at his best in the handling of the historical details that form the
basis for this book. His scrupulous handling of original sources is typical of the
author who for so long has enjoyed recognition as an exhaustive and authoritative
writer. The source materials which he uses have been collected in no other volume of
similar size and content. As a research work it is invaluable.
I believe, however, that praise of Dean Pound's book, no matter how eloquent,
would not be appreciated by him. Similarly, I believe, that no matter how many of
his readers become impressed with the need for reorganization of our courts he will
consider the book a failure unless reorganization is realized in fact. I think the only
satisfaction possible to him who has fought this fight for thirty years will come from
action on his proposals. Let us then not stop at praising Pound and his ideas, let us
do more than become impressed with the need for reform, let there be activity to
8. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 158 Mass. 555 (1893).
t Dean, Vanderbilt University, School of Law.
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bring about the needed reform. This book presents us with our brief, let us plead
the case.
JAMEs J. KEARNEYf
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: TrnRD SERIES. By Randolph E. Paul. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1940. pp. xvii, 539. $6.00.
This study of problems in federal taxation will probably prove to be the most
popular and valuable of the three excellent studies published by Mr. Paul,' for it
deals with the impact of the income tax law upon corporate reorganizations, trust
arrangements and life insurance plans.2 There are no more practical, no more diffi-
cult, fields of federal taxation than these three, so any illumination of them is most
welcome. Probably the light will never be so bright upon these fields that he who
runs may pass the brambles and the pit-falls in his way without scratch or stumble.
But Mr. Paul has thrown enough light upon them to enable the cautious traveler
to thread his way across with some chance of safe arrival at the other side. When
the taxpayer and his government meet face to face on the steps of the Treasury
there is likely to be a clash of utterly different philosophies. The taxpayer demands
that tax statutes be framed solely with the view to raise revenue for the customary
operations of the government. In case of doubt as to the scope or meaning of taxing
statutes he says they should be interpreted in his favor. But the government is apt,
in these days (although it was not always so), to view revenue raising for customary
purposes as only one of the objects of the tax system. Other objects are to secure
the redistribution of wealth and to put a brake on the concentration and exercise of
economic power. Sometimes downright punitive action is intended in order to satisfy
certain "hates". Doubts, the government says, should be resolved in favor of the
revenue collector. One cannot evaluate the current tax system and its fate in the
courts, as Paul does, without betraying a sympathy with one or the other school of
philosophy.
The "principle justification for increased taxes may be psychological rather than
fiscal", the author says in his preface. Thus, "war millionaires are bad for national
morale";3 so tax war profits to the limit. Probably most people will agree that the
captains of industry and the coupon clippers should not be permitted to exact their
pound of flesh from the nation's effort to preserve its existence. It is somewhat
curious though that many of those who cry out the loudest against the profiteers on
the capital side of industry at the same time look with indulgent eye upon the effort
of some of the labor side to take advantage of the same emergency to exact their
pound of flesh. Why not also an excess wages tax for national morale?
t Instructor of Law, University of Notre Dame, School of Law.
1. The First Series was published in 1937 and contained studies of "Tax Avoidance,"
"Valuation" and the "Bad Debt Provisions." The Second Series was published in 1938
and contained studies of "Federal Tax Compromises," "Res Judicata in Federal Taxation,"
"Ascertainment of 'Earnings or Profits' for the Purpose of Determining Taxability of Cor-
porate Distributions" and other subjects.
2. Also included are studies entitled: "Federal Income Tax Problems of Mortgagors




The author evidently approves Frankfurter's dictum that there is nothing in the
Constitution "to bar even a conscious use of the taxing power for readjusting the
social equilibrium". 4 Nothing indeed except that when the Constitution was adopted
by the people it was universally understood that the power of taxation was the power
to raise revenue to defray the expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the government. But I doubt if the power to tax as granted in that
instrument was thought to include the power to expropriate money from Peter in
order to give it to Paul.5 Taxes, the author reminds us, are the price we pay for
the benefits of civilization. 6 The late Justice Holmes is asserted to have said, when
asked if he didn't hate to pay taxes, "No, young feller, I like to pay taxes. With
them I buy civilization. ' 7 Taxes do buy civilization; for the record it may also be
noted that taxes support the activities of wasteful bureaucrats and buy political and
economic nostrums of all sorts. The author looks with approval on the recent ten-
dency of the Supreme Court to interpret the statutes broadly in favor of the govern-
ment, even to the extent of rounding out the incomplete pattern of legislative policy
with judicial legislation if necessary.8
Thus it appears that the author looks with indulgent eye upon the new philosophy
of taxation. Nevertheless, he does appear to be a man of goodwill with compassion
for the taxpayer after all. "Taxpayers are entitled to a fair definition of their re-
sponsibilities."9 "Mortgagors and mortgagees deserve a better fate."'10 "We have
an alarming multiplication of meticulous detail in overloaded statutes and regula-
tions."' 1 The welter of conflicting decisions is deplored and simplification of the
statute is urged. A critical appraisal follows each of the five studies and as often
as not the author pleads for reforms that will aid the taxpayer by removing confusion
or by bringing about a more equitable distribution of the tax burden.
The historical development of the "almost unbelievably complicated" reorganiza-
tion provisions is painstakingly traced in the first of the studies and the cases are
fully covered. The "continuity of interest theory", "the Gregory rule" and the
"Hendler doctrine" receive extended attention. Should the reorganization sections
go? The author hesitates to say, but in any event, they need substantial revision.
"There is something wrong with provisions which remain so obscure, in spite of
filigree detail in the statute and regulations, that hardly any prediction as to their
meaning can be made without the feeling that it is little better than a dignified
guess .... Perhaps this is the underlying problem of taxation today."' 2
The study of revocable trusts and the income tax is interesting and informative.
The provisions of the law, the author says, attempt "to reach Indian-giver grantors
who retain substantial dominion or control over the trust and grantors who remain
the true beneficiaries of the trust by reason of the possible application of the corpus
4. P. vii.
5. No pun intended.
6. Preface, passim.
7. P. 165, n. 4, quoting from Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court,
p. 42 (1939).
8. See for example p. 175 et seq. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).






or income for their benefit. . . .It may be fairly concluded that on the whole they
have failed to accomplish their objective, and that trusts are still a successful tax
avoidance mechanism."'13 But Helvering v. Clifford14 indicates that a new day is
dawning for the Treasury in its struggle to defeat the deep laid schemes of the tax-
avoiders. What Congress has failed to do in Sections 166 and 167 of the Internal
Revenue Code, the Court has done with Section 22(a). The author takes a short
flight into the realms of jurisprudence when he comments on the implications and
criticisms of the Clifford case. He thinks uncertainty is not to be decried when it is
used by the courts to defend the revenue; when the legislature has been inept or
has blundered a little judicial legislation is in order.' 5 Changing the rules in the middle
of the game is all right when the Indian-givers oppose the Treasury. But later the
author concedes that there is something to be said for putting taxpayers reasonably
" upon notice of the law's command." But "what should be done is more than one
person should venture to say."'16
The chapter on the "Income Tax Problems of Mortgagors and Mortgagees" is writ-
ten jointly by Mr. Paul and George S. Allan. The confusion in the authorities as to
whether income is realized or a deductible loss occurs in a foreclosure and as to whether
a loss is an ordinary or a capital loss is pointedly brought out. The authorities in this
field, as in the others studied, are well analyzed. The authors conclude that statutory
amendments are badly needed. And so it goes through the studies of "Life Insurance,
Annuities, and The Income Tax" and of "Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in
Statutory Construction". Conflicting authorities; tax-avoidance loopholes; uncer-
tainty; realism here; transcendentalism there. As Ko-Ko might say: "Here's a how-
do-do! Here's a pretty mess! Here's a state of things!" The tax consultant's life
is not a happy one.
In spite of the uncertainty in some directions, there are many doctrines that are
becoming well established and which are not likely to change. The author's analysis
of the cases is excellent and many a lawyer will get help from his pages. It is a
service, too, to have the uncertainties and shifting doctrines clearly indicated. The
author's style makes the text not only clear but interesting, which is something of an
accomplishment in writing upon so abstract and generally dry a subject as taxation.
The footnotes are exhaustive. Certainly nearly a thousand cases, if not more, from
the courts and the Board of Tax Appeals are cited. One very valuable feature of
the book is the list of law review articles and other sources of material on the sub-
ject. With the author's admirable text and this list of authorities the student of the




14. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
15. Pp. 207-13.
16. P. 294.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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ELECTIONS AGAINST WILLs. By Glenn C. Beechler. New York City: Matthew
Bender & Company. 1940. pp. xix, 751. $10.00.
The author of this book must be a proselyte of the school of writers which pro-
duced Anthony Adverse and Gone With The Wind. This does not mean that he is
a producer of fiction, nor yet that his product is likely to become the bone of con-
tention among those acquiring the names of future moving pictures. When it is
recollected that Section 18 of the Decedent Estates Law of the State of New York,
which constitutes the author's central theme, occupies only four printed pages in
the McKinney edition of our statutes, one is compelled to marvel at the ingenuity of
an author who can produce a book two inches in thickness from such a small begin-
ning. The mustard seed of Biblical narrative has been indeed outdone.
It is not difficult to dissect the process by which the author has thus developed
his point of departure into his port of accomplishment. He has included forty-six
forms occupying eighty-three pages, an appendix of fourteen pages containing the
text of the statutes given and discussed piecemeal in the book, and a second appen-
dix of sixty pages containing decisions reprinted from the New York Law Journal-
An index of forty-seven pages facilitates access to the balance of the book. Thus
the actual text is a trifle under 550 pages in length. In this textual part the author
has at the beginning of each of his nineteen chapters a "Summary of the Chapter,"
consisting usually of one to three pages of text. This gives the substance of the
entire chapter, the balance consisting of material more commonly put into the foot-
notes of a text book. In order to give an exactly correct picture on this point the
reviewer worked over the first 148 pages of the text. Of these, twenty-one pages, or
approximately fifteen percent, consisted of the above described "summary material."
Of the remaining eighty-five percent, seventy-seven pages (constituting fifty-two per-
cent of the 148 pages) appeared within quotation marks and consisted of the text
of statutes, the text of Commission Reports and excerpts from court decisions. If
these proportions hold for the entire book-and a non-mathematical inspection indi-
cates that it does-the 550 pages of text would break down into some eighty pages
of statement of the author's conclusions on the law, 286 pages of quoted excerpts
and 184 pages of other material in footnote and text form constituting the author's
arguments in support of his conclusions.
The facts already stated do not, in any way, justify a conclusion that this book is
not worth its price. In fact, the reviewer believes that it is almost a necessary book
on the shelves of any lawyer who draws wills or handles the estates of decedents. It is,
in reality, a source book, bringing together within two covers the products of the
legislature and of the courts during a trifle more than a decade of time, on a most
important topic. It makes available to a large fraction of the bar many otherwise
inaccessible decisions printed in the New York Law Journal. The chapter entitled
"The source of the 'intestate share' and abatement" (Chapter X, pages 253-306) is
a helpful exposition of a most difficult aspect of this law. The least valuable paits
are Chapter III on "Elections in Sister States" (pages 30-80) and Chapter XVIII
on "Drafting the Will" (pages 478-488). In both of these chapters the treatment is
unevenly incomplete and quite inadequate. Occasionally the author indulges in highly
useful suggestions -for improvement in the law, as for example concerning the desira-
bility of a differentiation between ordinary spouses and a second (or subsequent)
spouse married late in the life of the intestate.
RicHARD R. PowELLt
t Professor of Law, Columbia University, School of Law.
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TH LIFE oF SiR THomAS MoR.. By Cresacre More. London: 1726. Edited and
Modernized by James L. Kennedy. Penn: Riverside Press. 1941. pp. xvi, 211.
$3.75.
The express aim of the editor of this highly inspirational book is to facilitate access
to one of the great classic biographies of the immortal lawyer-saint, and to heighten
its popularity in the twentieth century by modernizing such mechanical and acci-
dental aspects of the eighteenth century edition as spelling, punctuation, and the like.
In pursuance of this objective, the editor has replaced the footnotes of the eighteenth
century edition, "invaluable to the researcher, but unnecessary for the present pur-
pose", with an index and a valuable, up-to-date bibliography of important works
which have been written about Saint Thomas More. The inclusion of a beautiful
reproduction of the famous portrait of him, as Lord High Chancellor of England, by
Hans Holbein in the Frick collection, materially enhances the attractiveness of the
volume. But "streamlining" has been achieved without any sacrifice of the thought
or beautiful language of Cresacre More, so that "the substance, the spirit, the grace-
ful prose poetry of the original remain sacred and intact".
Cresacre More, who died in Rome in 1649, while on a business and diplomatic
mission, did not publish the biography which, however, he had completed. Publication
followed posthumously. This is supposed to have taken place in London in 1651 and
previously in Louvain. The present reprint has been made from the eighteenth
century edition of 1726.
Despite seizure of important papers by Henry VIII, which rendered difficult the
accurate tracing of such matters as the genealogy of the More family, Cresacre More
was in a position to write a correct and authoritative account of the life of his dis-
tinguished ancestor. It was based on an intimate knowledge of the matters presented.
This was made possible by Cresacre's relatively close lineal relationship to Sir Thomas.
Ample documentation is further assurance of the authenticity of. the work, which
"has been consulted and admired by scholars since its first publication". But in
presenting precise historical materials, Cresacre has at the same time produced a
literary gem which affords unmistakable evidence of his wide cultural background and
scholarly attainments.
This biography of Sir Thomas is the careful effort of a manifestly devout, religious
and competent author who is rightly proud of his descent from his martyred forbear,
and who undertakes lovingly to create for posterity a living record of the character,
private and public life, and intellectual and moral greatness of a truly remarkable
personality. As the life of Saint Thomas More unfolds with the deft and critical
presentation of events in chronological order, his many-sided genius is revealed in
such diverse spheres as law, philosophy, letters, diplomacy, statecraft and even
theology. Beneath a unity of character essentially dependent upon a rational but
complete submission of will to God, whose representative on earth he recognizes in
the Pope of the Catholic Church, there is an inner balance of opposites which defies
analysis, for example, his austerities, yet buoyant, irrepressible wit and humor, the
fatherly affection he had for all in his household, yet his insistence upoin firm familial
authority, his life of contemplation, yet his career of immense activity, his contempt
for wealth, yet his great earning capacity as the foremost barrister of his time. The
dominating fullness of Saint Thomas More's life, which included a multitude of ac-
tivities, is the crucial thesis constantly but unobstrusively impressed upon the reader.
The success of the biographer results from his power to sense and express the spiritual
1941]
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implications of the crucial decisions which determined the direction of the Chancellor-
Saint's life.
Cresacre's work is intended as a general biography with no attempt to specialize
with respect to a particular phase of his ancestor's career. The legal phases, as such,
of the life of Saint Thomas More, therefore, are not stressed. But these aspects of
his career naturally loom so large upon the horizon of his historic fame that it is
impossible in any narrative of his life to slight them. This generalization is verified
in the present instance because Cresacre has devoted considerable space and attention
to the early legal studies, legal practice and astounding skill and success, as a barrister,
of Sir Thomas. An entire chapter has been alloted to a narration of the chief events
which lead to his elevation to the Lord High Chancellorship, his exemplary personal
behavior while on the Woolsack, and his profound wisdom in the administration of
justice. Another chapter deals with his arraignment, trial and condemnation on the
charge of treason for failure to take the oath of supremacy and thereby acknowledge
Henry VIII as head of the Church of England. This latter chapter contains fasci-
nating evidence of the juridical maturity and judicial qualities of mind which in-
fluential legal historians unanimously ascribe to the martyred Chancellor. Hence the
book has a special appeal to the legalist, regardless of the particular branch of the
legal profession to which he may have dedicated himself.
But this book affords lawyers and legal scholars far more interesting reading and
valuable material concerning the life of a towering jurist, credited by Professor Holds-
worth with the inauguration of a new era in the history of English Chancery. It
holds up to them, as well as those in such related public realms as politics and state-
craft, which many lawyers enter, a model, embodying both an ideal of professional
success and a moral example which if kept in mind will not fail to be a source of
personal encouragement. Here is an illustration of the proposition that integrity,
indeed sanctity itself, is not a barrier but rather an aid to the attainment of the
highest worldly success. In so far as that success was at the bar and on the bench
in the case of Sir Thomas More, he becomes the perfect model for the Anglo-American
lawyer, his most appropriate patron saint and sympathetic inspirer to do the right
and to promote justice without fear of physical or financial consequence.
Even here the message of the work does not end. It compresses within its pages
a mighty challenge to those of our day who would fight on for the underlying
philosophy for which St. Thomas More went to the block without complaint. His
was a protest against the omnicompetent state, the usurpation by the state of the
right to command men's consciences, and the twisting of reason into an instrument
with which to justify unbridled desires, interests and claims. In contemporary lan-
guage, he was "purged" or "liquidated" for refusing to subordinate the dictates of
his conscience to the morally illegal will of the political dictator; he refused to go
along with the "party".
The philosophy which Saint Thomas vindicated by his martyrdom was reinforced
by the stamp of divine approval which the Catholic Church placed upon his choice
of alternatives. On December 29, 1886, Sir Thomas was beatified during the pontificate
of Leo XIII, (i.e.) was declared to be holy. The final declaration of his sanctity, so
that it was recognized throughout the whole Church, was made by Pius XI on May
19, 1935. By this canonization, Sir Thomas. was elevated to the glory of Sainthood.
For those of his religious faith, therefore, additional evidence of an irrebutable char-
acter became thus available to demonstrate the falsity of all types of political phil-
osophy which deify race or state.
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The editor of this modernized version of Cresacre's biography deserves well merited
congratulation for bringing it to the world's attention in these crucial hours in which
the future ethical structure or organization of every state and nation upon this earth
is being decided. The issue faced and decided by Saint Thomas More has become the
present problem of all mankind. The psychosis of an influential and strong willed
ruler of one people, conjuring up delusions of grandeur, has evolved into the madness
of millions. In sixteenth century England, the decision of a whole people, both clergy
and laity, practically speaking, to combine religious and temporal authority in one
man, resulted in the suppression of minorities, the confiscation of property, and
bloodshed. The same drama has been enacted in twentieth century Germany and
Russia where complete infallibility with respect to all matters of life was conferred
upon a dictator.
As citizens of America and residents of the world, let us cling tenaciously to the
ideals of Saint Thomas More. Now is the time to re-study his life and re-dedicate
ourselves to the advocacy of a supreme law of God to which the will of every human
being is subject. Let the cult of this saint encompas§ humanity. Then will there be
a definite guarantee that the legions of anarchy and chaos will not prevail and that
a spirit of relative peace, based on order and harmony, will permeate the earth.
BRENDAN F. BROWNt
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AmERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY. By
James A. Gathings. Washington: Amer. Council on Public Affairs. 1940. pp.
143. $3.00.
This is a thorough and well founded summary of the history of treatment of alien
enemy property,--in the world at large as well as in the United States,--leading up
to 1914 and the generally accepted principle that aliens entering in good faith were
entitled to decent treatment even though two nations might be at war. This was a
gradual change from the earlier doctrine, so often followed by the courts, that all
enemy property is necessarily hostile property. Vattel in Europe and Alexander
Hamilton in the United States in earlier days, and John Bassett Moore and Edwin
Borchard more recently have been its strongest protagonists. Treaty and custom
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries tended to break down the harsh earlier rule.
At the same time, however, the course of warfare in the 19th century was changing
circumstances. War was no longer an affair of merely professional armies, a differ-
ence to be decided by battlefield success or defeat. War became total war. In the
early 20th century, we began to hear of "the nation in arms" and now we hear of
"total war." Every element of economic as well as military strength, weighs in the
balance. So it has happened, as the author of this excellent book points out in his
next major group of dhapter, the attitude toward alien enemy property harshened.
To prevent aid and comfort being given to the enemy, alien enemy property at home
might be sequestered. So sequestered, it might be used for the benefit of the home
nation, but the state might be considered to be under an obligation to return the
property or reimburse the owner, when war was no longer flagrant. This was the
theory on which the allied powers acted until the Treaty of Versailles. The modern
rule of international law was still held sound and valid. The only purpose of re-
t Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, School of Law.
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strictions on enemy property at home was, as the New York Court of Appeals said
in Techt v. Hughes, to prevent the property being of use to an enemy in a war in
which all resources might be important.
The Treaty of Versailles (and America's Treaty of Berlin) took direct action against
this property. They made Germany admit her fault and responsibility for the war
and for all damages caused by the war. Claims were to be submitted for the evalua-
tion of those damages. It was then determined legislatively that, if Germany failed
to pay those claims, the alien enemy property in America might be held as security
for such payment-making a third party financially responsible for the delinquencies
of one of the parties to the claims adjudications. Such determination by the political
department of the government-however distorted and however at variance with
established principles of international law-was binding up the judiciary. Aliens de-
prived of their property were unable to recover it by legal means. Even if it is
acknowledged that part of that property was returned, there was some still unre-
turned, and the eventual result is not much different from confiscation.
Against such a contingency the author plans. He recognizes that courts must act
under national rather than international law. He recognizes that the alien enemy is
without recourse so long as international law be the only support he has for his case.
He therefore proposes that by effecting a multitude of joint treaties, it be agreed
by nations-and so become a part of the "law of the land" in the United States-
that although private property may be sequestered in the interests of military suc-
cess it must be returned upon suit brought against the government by the alien who
was temporarily deprived of it. The suggestion is not without merit. It avoids many
of the faults of other procedure which might be devised. It provides specific legal
channels. It implements in national law the doctrine in international law which is
all too often promoted only by vague phrases and cripplecf by debilitating "reserva-
tions."
The suggestion may work. It would be some brake against the onrushing force
of modern total war and conquest as it seems to be waged in Europe since 1938.
How effective it would be against the whims of dictatorial governments who have
no concern for their former promises, is problematical. At any rate, we welcome
the volume. With prospects of declarations of war in the not very distant future,
and with the Trading with the Enemy acts still on our statute books, the volume is
worth the perusal of the profession, and may be bandy to have by for reference,
when clients may be faced with future sequestration or confiscation. There is no
flying in the face of public policy expressed in the legislative acts of politics, but
there is opportunity to foresee what may transpire and to learn in advance of what
disabilities might be imposed upon property, apparently "innocent" which may be-
come "hostile."
ELBRiDGE CoLBY±
t Lieutenant Colonel, Army War College.
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LA PORTEE TH0oRIQUE Du GLISSEMENT DU DRoiT VERS LA SOCIOLOGIE. N. Kral-
yevitch. Paris. 1939. pp. 323.
ELiMENTS DE SoCiOLOGiE JuRmiQuE. G. Gurvitch. Paris. 1940. pp. 267.
Two books which almost simultaneously appeared in France' testify to the in-
creasing interest in the sociological treatment of problems which, for centuries, were
considered to be the exclusive domain of jurists.
The first, written by N. Kralyevitch, a young Yugoslav scholar, analyses the
causes of the changing approach to the problems of law. In his opinion, the tradi-
tional science of law is not science, but the theory of a special art. Up to a quite
recent time, this art was based on the general acceptance of the hypothesis of the law
of nature; now, this acceptance is vanishing, and another foundation must be found
which can only be social reality as studied by sociology.
From the standpoint of sociology, law is not an independent social force, but the
equilibrium of such forces. By means of law, this equilibrium may be rationalized
and positive forces given supremacy. Having no force of its own, law can achieve this
result only by opposing one set of forces to another. In every particular situation,
a number of regulations are possible; the law selects one of them. Being a regimenta-
tion of social forces, law, in its efficacy, depends on the actual correlation of their
relative strength.
The author obviously belongs to utilitarian school considering human activity
merely from the standpoint of interests and their conflicts. Jhering is frequently
quoted, and the French institutional school of law rejected because of its affinity with
scholastic philosophy. The sociologists who constitute the author's chief authorities
are the extreme "positivists", especially Gumplowicz and Oppenheimer, and in some
places their special teaching is presented as that of sociology in general.
The second book written by G. Gurvitch, a prominent philosopher of law of
Russian origin who, for many years, has taught in France and is now a refugee in
this country, is a concise, but systematically complete treatment of the field of
sociology of law. The author begins by analysing what he calls "the microsociology
of law"; the correlation between different forms of human relations and the different
types of law is submitted to a stimulating study. Then, there follows a "juridical
typology", where the different forms of the integration of individuals in groups and
their impact on law are studied; a natural hierarchy of legal orders, as emanating
from different groups, is thus established. As particular social groups are integrated
in "total societies", ideal types of legal systems are created; their analysis forms
"the microsociology of law". Finally, the tendencies of the development of law and
the factors determining this development are submitted to an enlightening analysis.
The finding is that tendencies may be established only within each of the individual
legal systems and that they express only probabilities, not necessities. B'etween legal
systems there is a kind of hiatus, and prediction of change becomes impossible.
The book is obviously an important contribution to the very young science of the
sociology of law. Its main defect is the unduly broad concept of law used throughout
the work: Gurvitch identifies law with any form of regulation imposed by social
groups on their members; in this manner, all that is called folkways, mores, and a
large part of morals comes under this concept.
N. S. TmsAsHEFr
1. In addition to a French translation of the writer's "Introduction to the Sociology of
Law".
t Author of The Sociology of Law (1939); Professor of Political Science, Fordham Uni-
versity.
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